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FOREWORD: ACTS OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY:
THE WORDS AND DEEDS OF GOVERNOR
GEORGE RYAN
JOHN CHARLES BOGER*
During the final days of his term in early 2003, Illinois Governor
George Ryan exercised gubernatorial clemency on a scale without
precedent in the history of American capital punishment. First, on
January 10, 2003, speaking before an audience at DePaul University
College of Law, Governor Ryan announced a decision to pardon four
African-American inmates, concluding that none of the four
committed the crimes for which they had been capitally sentenced:'
"Today, I am pardoning them of crimes for which they were
wrongfully prosecuted and sentenced to die ... The system has failed
for all four men," Governor Ryan said, "[a]nd it has failed the people
of this state."2
The next day, Governor Ryan traveled to Northwestern
University Law School. Its Center on Wrongful Convictions was
among those institutions whose findings documented egregious errors
and mistakes in Illinois capital cases. These findings impelled the
Governor, three years earlier, to declare a statewide moratorium on
executions while a blue ribbon commission undertook a
comprehensive study of Illinois' capital charging and sentencing
system.3 Although the commission eventually recommended dozens
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, and Deputy Director,
University of North Carolina Center for Civil Rights. A.B., 1968, Duke University;
M.Div., 1971, Yale University; J.D., 1974, University of North Carolina School of Law. I
am grateful to Catalina Azuero, University of North Carolina School of Law, Class of
2004, for her excellent research assistance and to Anthony V. Alfieri for conceiving of this
Colloquium and recruiting its distinguished participants.
1. Steve Mills & Cristi Parsons, "The System has Failed:" Ryan Condemns Injustice,
Pardons 6; Paves the Way for Sweeping Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2003, § 1, at 1.
2. Id.
3. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Clemency for All; Ryan Commutes 164 Death
Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole; "There is No Honorable Way to Kill," He Says,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1; see also CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, A
CONSTITUENCY FOR THE INNOCENT, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/
wrongful/History.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (recounting the launching of the Center
during the fall of the 1999-2000 academic year at Northwestern University Law School)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The establishment of the Center on
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of changes in a report issued in April of 2002, 4 Governor Ryan was
unable to persuade the Illinois General Assembly to adopt any of the
suggested reforms.5
Ryan therefore decided to take unilateral action. Delivering a
major address on January 11, 2003, to a Northwestern University
audience that included exonerated death-row inmates, as well as law
school students, Governor Ryan shared his own experience with
Illinois' system of capital charging and sentencing.6 After assuring
listeners that he was no stranger to the violent loss that accompanies
homicide-a brutal murder had taken the life of a close family friend
and neighbor of the Ryans 7-- and after recounting his meetings with
the families of victims,8 Governor Ryan poured out his mounting
distress with the error and capriciousness that he had found in
Illinois' "deeply flawed" criminal justice system.9 Declaring that he
"must act" in the face of this overwhelming evidence, Ryan
announced his decision to grant executive clemency to each one of
the 167 Illinois inmates awaiting execution on the state's death row. 0
Never before has an American governor exercised his clemency
powers so broadly. The largest previous mass clemency spared eight
capital inmates in Ohio in 1991."l Indeed, not since 1972, when the
United States Supreme Court issued its 5-4 decision in Furman v.
Georgia,2 lifting the death sentences of 633 inmates, has any single
American legal body freed more inmates facing death by execution. 3
Wrongful Convictions was prompted by a Northwestern University professor's work to
exonerate three Illinois inmates and a national conference at Northwestern in 1998 that
brought together twenty-eight innocent and freed death row inmates. Id. These
developments, along with a series of investigative journalism articles in the Chicago
Tribune, led to Governor Ryan's moratorium announcement in January of 2000. Id.
4. See ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILLINOIS,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Apr. 2002),
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
5. Laurent Belsie, Big Setback, and New Ire, on Death Penalty, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 13,2003, at 1, 4.
6. Governor George M. Ryan, "I Must Act," Speech at Northwestern University
School of Law 1-2 (Jan. 11, 2003), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=
13&did=551 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 11; see also Abdon M. Pallasch et al., Gov. Ryan Empties Death Row of All
167, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 2.
11. Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement
and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1319 n.1 (2004).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
13. See generally HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
1280 [Vol. 82
FOREWORD
The public response to Governor Ryan's mass clemency was
sharply divided. International leaders, many of whom oppose on
principle America's continued use of capital punishment, voiced a
chorus of approval. South African President Nelson Mandela called
to congratulate the Governor. In addition, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, the Vatican, and leaders of the European Community, Poland,
and Mexico, among others, offered warm support. 4 However, many
within the State of Illinois, especially members of the political and law
enforcement communities, responded with anger and condemnation.
State Senator George Haine, a former prosecutor, described
Governor Ryan's mass clemency as "an extraordinary and a
breathtaking act of arrogance."15 Senator Haine declared that:
George Ryan has severed the bond of trust between those who
hold great power on behalf of the people and the people
themselves .... [H]e may have irreparably injured the law
itself .... He has certainly committed a great wrong against the
victims, and he has profoundly insulted his subordinates in the
system-the state's attorneys, the police officers, the jurors and
judges-with his pen and his reckless language. 6
Determined to challenge Governor Ryan's action as not only
unwarranted but illegal, the Attorney General of Illinois filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Illinois,
seeking a judicial decree to prevent the state's Director of
Corrections or its prison wardens from recording the clemencies. The
Attorney General asserted a variety of state constitutional and
statutory arguments, some founded in separation of powers concerns,
to support the petition. 7 Although the Supreme Court of Illinois
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (1997) (documenting developments in the death penalty since
Furman).
14. See Pallasch et al., supra note 10; see also Barry James, Clearing of Illinois Death
Row is Greeted by Cheers Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at A10 (reporting support
from sixty lawyers and judges, the International Commission of Jurists, and Walter
Schwimmer, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe).
15. Steve Whitworth, Haine Enraged by Governor's Move, TELEGRAPH (Alton, Ill.),
Jan. 12, 2003, http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/coverage/44.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
16. Id.; see also The State's Attorneys Angry but Helpless, HERALD NEWS, Jan. 12,
2003 (reporting the response of Illinois prosecutors to Ryan's commutation),
http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/coverage/41.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Jodie Wilgoren, Illinois Prosecutors Assess Death Penalty's New Era, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at A18.
17. See People ex rel. Madigan, v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546, 550-52 (Ill. 2004). The
petition contended that since article V, section 12 of the Illinois Constitution provides that
"the manner of applying" for reprieves, commutations, or pardons "may be regulated by
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declined to grant the writ, reasoning that the Illinois Constitution
reposed unreviewable authority in its governor to issue clemencies
and pardons,18 the court ended its opinion with a paragraph implicitly
disapproving the Governor's exercise of his authority:
As a final matter, we note that clemency is the historic remedy
employed to prevent a miscarriage of justice where the judicial
process has been exhausted. We believe that this is the purpose
for which the framers gave the Governor this power in the
Illinois Constitution. The grant of this essentially unreviewable
power carries with it the responsibility to exercise it in the
manner intended. Our hope is that Governors will use the
clemency power in its intended manner-to prevent
miscarriages of justice in individual cases. 9
Governor Ryan's exercise of clemency, especially on such a mass
scale, raises fundamental questions about the proper objectives of
criminal law, including the underlying purposes of punishment, the
demands of retributive justice, and most pointedly, the role of mercy.
This Colloquium brings together five of the nation's most thoughtful
observers of law, jurisprudence, and public policy-Austin Sarat,
Stephen Garvey, Jonathan Simon, Robert Weisberg, and Anthony
Alfieri-to address these issues. Taking Governor Ryan's actions as
their starting point, each offers wider and complementary reflections.
Austin Sarat's article focuses on Governor Ryan's rhetorical
justifications for his clemency announcements, asking whether Ryan
was successfully able to reconcile his expressed concern for murder
law," see ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12, and since the Illinois General Assembly had exercised
that authority to require petitions for clemency to "be in writing and signed by the person
under conviction or by a person on his behalf," ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-13(a) (West
1997), the Governor was not authorized to act on behalf of any inmates who had not filed
proper written petitions. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d at 551.
18. The court responded to the Attorney General's statutory argument by stating that
while the provision at issue authorized the legislature to regulate the process for applying
for clemency, it did not restrain the Governor's broad authority to grant clemency under
article V, section 13 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution "on such terms as he thinks proper."
Snyder, 804 N.E.2d at 551. The court also rejected arguments that Governor Ryan's
clemency orders could not reach inmates whose sentences had been reversed on appeal
and were awaiting resentencing. Id. at 554. In addition, the court upheld the Governor's
authority under the Illinois Constitution to grant convicted capital defendants what
amounted to a "partial pardon," under which any possibility of death sentences was
removed, leaving them, by executive action, to face a maximum possible sentence of life
imprisonment without parole. Id. at 558. Finally, the court rejected separation of powers
arguments that the Governor's actions had "usurped the authority of the State's Attorneys
to decide what punishment to seek" or that he "interfered with the judiciary's sentencing




victims with the principles of retributive justice he implicitly
accepted. 0 Stephen Garvey turns from the rhetorical struggle to
search for philosophical justifications that place mercy within some
broader theory of justice and punishment.21 Unable to situate mass
clemency within modern retributive theories, Garvey proposes an
alternative theory, "punishment as atonement," which could provide,
he suggests, a more coherent rationale for Governor Ryan's actions.22
Robert Weisberg's essay aims not to weigh the normative
justification of Governor Ryan's words or deeds, but rather to
explore how other institutional actors during the modern capital
punishment era have accommodated the conflicting impulses toward
justice and mercy.23 Weisberg's intriguing account finds other
cognate "acts of mercy" exercised by judicial and legislative
authorities as forms of apologia-confessions of systemic failure in
the administration of criminal justice and capital sentencing systems.24
Jonathan Simon, by contrast, invites readers to hear the anguished
voices of victims' families who spoke in emotionally charged
clemency hearings held during October and November of 2002.25
Simon draws parallels between this contemporary victim speech and
parrhesia, a distinctive form of rhetorical address in ancient Athens,
and he uses that comparison to explore the significance of victims'
speech for contemporary decisionmaking in capital cases. Finally,
Anthony Alfieri reflects upon the difficult mission faced by capital
defense lawyers in clemency proceedings, during which arguments
that are forbidden at guilt or sentencing proceedings-appeals to "the
racial character of crime and criminal justice," overtly religious
appeals, and "faith-based claims of redemption"-become not merely
appropriate but perhaps decisive.26 In sum, a rich feast awaits the
readers of this Colloquium. To sharpen appetites, this Foreword
offers a few introductory observations on each piece.
Austin Sarat's incisive meditation begins with Governor Ryan's
"I Must Act" speech, which Sarat ultimately judges as a failed
20. See Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution, and
George Ryan's Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346-47 (2004).
21. See Garvey, supra note 11, at 1321.
22. See id. at 1323, 1335.
23. See Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415,
1421-39 (2004).
24. See id. at 1417.
25. See Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital
Crime Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377,1380 (2004).
26. Anthony V. Alfieri, Mercy Lawyers, 82 N. C. L. REV.1297, 1315-16 (2004).
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attempt "to reconcile the irreconcilable. 27  In an effort to
simultaneously embrace victims' suffering and act upon some version
of retribution, Governor Ryan undertook, in Sarat's view, "to make a
square peg fit in a round hole," a doomed effort "symptomatic of the
complex and contradictory pulls of victims' rights and retribution in
our legal and political systems.
28
Sarat suggests that "modern legality" has been built upon an
essentially retributive foundation, aiming "to make reason triumph
over emotion and to make punishments proportional in their severity
to the crimes that occasion them. '29 This Kantian approach finds
contemporary articulation in the work of Robert Nozick, among
others, who stress the ways in which retributive punishment must
achieve an impartiality and proportionality that necessarily "distances
itself from the claims of private victims."30
The contemporary victims' rights movement has strongly
challenged this impersonal approach, Sarat reports, demanding a
more central role for victims in the resolution of criminal judgments.3
Citing political pressure from an increasingly pro-death penalty public
and from victims' groups in recent decades, Sarat chronicles a
consequent decline in gubernatorial exercise of clemency.
Specifically, Sarat contrasts the broader view of clemency embraced
by Governors Terry Sanford of North Carolina, Lee Cruce of
Oklahoma, Pat Brown of California, Winthrop Rockefeller of
Arkansas, and Tony Anaya of New Mexico, who often employed "the
rhetoric of high moralism" from the 1960s through the early 1980s,32
with the far narrower retributive justifications and the more sparing
use of clemency by modern governors, including such governors-
become-presidents as William J. Clinton of Arkansas and George W.
Bush of Texas.33
Governor Ryan took great care in his "I Must Act" speech, Sarat
notes, to situate himself within the contemporary rhetorical world of
victims' rights and to acknowledge their pain and loss. Ryan shared
with his listeners an extended story of a horrible murder that had
occurred in his hometown, where Ryan knew both murderer and
27. Sarat, supra note 20, at 1347.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1350.
30. Id. at 1351.
31. Id. at 1363; see also id. at 1364 (contending that "Ryan's mass commutation was
situated in the saga of an increasingly victim-centered political and legal environment").
32. Id. at 1357.
33. See id. at 1358.
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victim.34  Ryan assured listeners that he had tested his clemency
decision against this personal experience, characterizing himself as
someone "caught, almost literally torn, between the victim and the
offender.
35
Yet ultimately, Sarat suggests, Governor Ryan did not make his
clemency decision in response to the emotional world of victims and
their suffering. Instead, "he turned from responsiveness to suffering
in a community of victims to a critique of the institutions of the legal
and political system for being insufficiently attentive to the claims of
retributive justice. '36  What Sarat emphasizes in that movement,
however, is that Governor Ryan's clemency, while striking in its
breadth, is "yet quite continuous with the emerging [retributive] logic
governing executive clemency."37
Ryan "neither linked clemency to mercy nor ... elevate[d] it
to... moral stature,' 38 as had Governors Sanford, Rockefeller,
Anaya, and others before him. Instead, he justified his actions on
systemic grounds,39 finding that Illinois' system was so flawed in its
execution of the criminal justice tasks assigned to it that he could no
longer repose confidence in its life-or-death sentencing judgments.4'
Sarat emphasizes that Governor Ryan's theme is characteristic of
"the new abolitionist [who] does not oppose state killing as an affront
to morality or as per se unconstitutional" but decries demonstrated
failures to observe substantive or procedural norms.41
In the penultimate portion of his address at Northwestern
University, Governor Ryan turned to the Illinois legislators. He
lamented their refusal to enact any of the procedural reforms
recommended by his Commission on Capital Punishment, despite
their promise to mitigate or eliminate the flaws uncovered in the
Illinois system. This refusal, Ryan concluded, left Illinois " 'a
rudderless ship.' "42 Sarat chronicles this final rhetorical step: " 'The
legislature couldn't reform it. Lawmakers won't repeal it. But I will
not stand for it. I must act.' Ryan plunged into that lawful
lawlessness that today, as it always has, marks the exercise of
34. Id. at 1364-65.
35. Id. at 1366.
36. Id. at 1369.
37. Id. at 1360.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 1360-61.
40. See id. at 1371-72.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1374 (quoting Ryan, supra note 6, at 5).
2004] 1285
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sovereign prerogative."43
Sarat concludes that Ryan's decision, however appropriate, was
"contradictory and somewhat incoherent" in its justifications," since
his rhetorical justification rested upon two foundations that neither
he, nor any modern philosopher, has yet been able to reconcile-
victims' claims and retributivist principles that together represent
"the contradictory forces that mark our contemporary political
condition."45
Stephen Garvey's essay, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row?
Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy,46 concerns itself not with
rhetorical forms but rather with the normative judgment reflected in
Governor Ryan's decision. Garvey frames his ultimate question as
whether it "[i]s ... morally legitimate for a governor to use the
clemency power to commute the death sentences of everyone on a
state's death row in the name of mercy."47
To answer that question, Garvey explores two variant theories of
retributive mercy, neither of which he finds adequate to justify mass
commutations. If retributive principles require the state to punish an
offender to the extent that he or she deserves, then mercy appears to
interfere with, and compromise, retributive duty.4  If mercy is
considered instead "a gift or act of grace" by the sovereign, its use
compromises principles of evenhandedness and seems, once again,
problematic.
49
One solution to this problem, Garvey suggests, is to imagine
"mercy as equity."" On this view, the role of mercy is to redress
sentences that prove to be inequitable, either because the trial and
appellate processes somehow failed to detect and remove error or
because the rules are too overbroad or under-inclusive to permit
substantive justice under the unique facts of a especially compelling
case. 1 This theory, however, ultimately turns mercy into "justice in
disguise," a "remedial mechanism" necessary to achieve "the result
the rules should have produced in the first place."52 Yet this theory
cannot explain or justify the wholesale clemencies Governor Ryan
43. Id. (quoting Ryan, supra note 6, at 10).
44. Id. at 1375.
45. Id. at 1376.
46. Garvey, supra note 11, at 1319.
47. Id. at 1321.
48. Id. at 1321-23.
49. Id. at 1324.
50. Id. at 1325-30.
51. Id. at 1325-28.
52. Id. at 1328-29.
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announced in Illinois, Garvey observes, for surely some fraction of
Illinois' death-row inmates received the sentences they deserved
under a retributive theory of punishment. 3
Under Garvey's alternative theory of "mercy as imperfect
obligation" 54 -which acknowledges that occasional acts of mercy do
exist in tension with equal treatment and strict justice, but
nonetheless might serve the important societal purpose that "tempers
justice" 55-the rub also comes with the breadth and indiscriminate
nature of Governor Ryan's decisions:
[T]he imperfect obligation to show mercy.always competes with
the perfect obligation to achieve retributive justice. As such,
with every act of mercy comes a corresponding denial of justice.
At some point, so it would seem, the demands of justice must
prevail against those of mercy.... Consequently, any decision
to commute all of death row would be too much of a good
thing-too much mercy, too little justice.
56
Garvey then turns to his own theory of mercy as atonement, one
he has previously explored in another article. 7 Under this theory
beyond retribution, punishment is neither an end in itself (as
retributivists believe) nor a means to another socially desirable end
such as deterrence or rehabilitation (as utilitarians believe). Instead,
punishment is "a necessary part of a larger process through which an
offender atones for his offense, a process leading ideally to the
reconciliation of the offender and those he wronged."58  Garvey's
theory depends upon a morally sophisticated idea of crime as more
than an injury to person or property, but as contempt for the victim
that breaches the preexisting relationship of trust and mutual respect,
"damaging the social bond between them, though not to the breaking
point."59
Atonement, which necessarily involves the wrongdoer's willing
submission to punishment, is the work that repairs the moral injury
and restores the social relationship between them. The wrongdoer
"pays for the moral injury of his crime through his willing submission
to the punishment he deserves. His punishment therefore sheds its
53. Id. at 1329.
54. Id. at 1330-34.
55. Id. at 1330-31.
56. Id. at 1334.
57. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1810,
1854 (1999).
58. Garvey, supra note 11, at 1336.
59. Id.
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character as punishment. It becomes a form of secular penance. '
Ideally, Garvey continues, the victim can then act to bestow the non-
obligatory, and admittedly difficult, but crucial gift of forgiveness.
With that corresponding act, the circle is complete and full
reconciliation occurs.61
When the state's punishment is death, Garvey reasons, a decree
like that of Governor Ryan preserves the life of all capital offenders
and thereby preserves the possibility of this circle of atonement. 62
Thus, Garvey concludes, "extending mercy to death-sentenced
offenders can be justified, not simply as a way to achieve equity or to
satisfy the demands of an imperfect obligation, but also as a way to
preserve the possibility of atonement. '63  While a decree offering
mass clemency to all of Illinois' death-row inmates is not obligatory
under such a theory, it becomes morally defensible.
As a former divinity student, issues of atonement touch a chord
within me.' Yet I despair over the prospect that any legislature
within the United States-in this era characterized by fierce punitive
severity and an all-but-wholesale abandonment of rehabilitative
ideals65-would seriously embrace the goal of reconciliation between
criminal inmates and their victims or between inmates and society at
large. While a theory of mercy as atonement might amply justify
mercy in a religiously millennial system of justice, it seems utopian in
the decidedly earthly systems that presently hold sway.
Yet Anthony Alfieri presses related concerns when he urges
60. Id. at 1336-37.
61. Id. at 1337.
62. Id. at 1341.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., KARL BARTH, IV CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF
RECONCILIATION passim (1956) (examining the Christian doctrines of atonement and
reconciliation comprehensively).
65. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981) (describing the rehabilitative ideal,
explaining why it flourished in the United States from the mid-nineteenth-century through
the 1970s, and documenting the social forces that brought about its rapid decline as penal
policy thereafter); LOIS G. FORGER, A RAGE TO PUNISH 47-52 (1994) (examining the
current desire to principally employ the criminal justice system of the United States as "a
system of crime control through the use of severe penalties"); TAMASAK WICHARAYA,
SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORMS ON
COURTS, PRISONERS, AND CRIMES 1 (1995) (recounting the widespread criticism of the
rehabilitative ideal in penal policy, noting that "[s]tate legislatures began by the mid-1970s
to discard the rehabilitative ideal, embrace a punitive response to criminal violence and
increasing crime rates, and in effect, revive the nineteenth-century determinate sentence
system"); Marc Mauer, Why are Tough on Crime Policies so Popular, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 9 (1999) (exploring the new "get tough" movement in the United States).
[Vol. 821288
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lawyers to view "the clemency process as a religious forum for lawyer
engagement and client revival. '66 Alfieri urges that after issues of
guilt or innocence have been resolved, and after statutory aggravating
and mitigating factors have been weighed during the capital
sentencing phase, "clemency-tailored moral individualization
demands a faith-based proffer of defendant religious awakening,
enlightenment, and devotion. ' 67 While Alfieri acknowledges that it is
"both necessary and paradoxical, and perhaps futile, to beg for
redemptive mercy from retributive agents,"'  he nonetheless
encourages clemency lawyers "to reintegrate mercy into the moral
paradigm of retribution, '69 pointing to "the rising historical moment
of theological integration increasingly pervading legal theory and
education.
70
Robert Weisberg shifts our attention from Garvey's normative
justification of mercy as atonement to the question of what kind of act
clemency actually is. Does it bestow forgiveness? Is it an
institutional form of forgetting? Is it, as Garvey suggests, a form of
atonement? Weisberg suggests two related alternatives: mercy
constitutes either "an act of apology .... [in which] the state, or the
society for which it acts, itself apologizes to the criminal ... [a]nd in
doing so ... also in some way confesses error,"71 or an apologia under
which, while not remitting punishment, "the legal authority
nevertheless confesses the errors in its system of justice, or at least
admits the appearance of error."72
After offering a thoughtful review of recent writing on the role of
mercy in a system of justice, and of the newly emerging theme of
restorative justice,73 Weisberg proposes to review the recent history of
the American legal system to study how it has "agonize[d] over the
relationship of justice to mercy, or ... consciously or unconsciously
rationalize[d] the relationship between the two."74 Weisberg suggests
that this story is "a narrative of neurotic, conflicted, erratic and
incomplete acts of mercy aimed at reconciling American law with
confessed errors in our history that no law can readily cure."75
66. Alfieri, supra note 26, at 1312.
67. Id. at 1309-10.
68. Id. at 1314.
69. Id. at 1316.
70. Id. at 1318.
71. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 1416-17.
72. Id. at 1417.
73. Id. at 1416-21.
74. Id. at 1421.
75. Id. at 1420-21.
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Weisberg sets out to demonstrate that "[t]he American
legal/political system has a very guilty conscience about the death
penalty,"76 emphasizing several earlier moments in which actors in the
system other than governors and/or other chief executives "granted a
kind of systemic pardon," in the form either of an express apology or
Weisberg's special apologia.77 Weisberg sees this guilty conscience at
work in the compromises adopted by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code in the mid-1950s.78 Professor Herbert Wechsler and other
drafters "were repelled by what they saw as the vulgarity of the death
penalty and its potential to cause social disruption,"7 9 but unable to
dictate immediate abolition. Thus, while they wrote "a reformist
code that had some reasonable chance of widespread adoption across
the states," they built into their sentencing regime a system of
"guided discretion," with enumerated aggravating and mitigating
criteria that would limit the discretion of sentencing juries.80
When the Supreme Court confronted the Model Penal Code's
handiwork in 1971 in McGautha v. California,"' it offered an initial
apologia that acknowledged the death penalty's imperfections but
refused to remit punishment. A year later, however, in Furman, the
Court's famous 5-4 judgment set forth in nine separate opinions'
proceeded to a full-scale apology, "in an implicit holding that
confessed nothing so simple as legal error at trial, but rather, the
moral failure of the whole history of capital punishment in the United
States."83 Furman had the practical effect of a mass clemency or "a
national act of amnesty," Weisberg notes, for it removed the death
sentences of every prisoner then under sentence of death throughout
the nation.84
When the Supreme Court upheld revised capital punishment
statutes four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia85 and companion cases,
8 6
76. Id. at 1421.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1425-26.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1426.
81. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
82. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
83. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 1427.
84. See DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE & THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22-25 (1997) (reporting on the practical impact of
Furman); see also WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH As PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 174-78 (1984) (same).
85. 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding the State of Georgia's
post-1972 capital statute).
86. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding the
1290 [Vol. 82
FOREWORD
Weisberg suggests that the ambiguous language of the prevailing
plurality opinion made it impossible to be sure whether the Court
categorically withdrew its Furman apology, or instead constructed "a
kind of conditional apologia," under which it would allow death
sentences to go forward pursuant to the reformulated statutes on the
assumption that their revisions would assure their constitutional
operation in practice.87
For Weisberg, "the great reckoning" came in 1987 in McCleskey
v. Kemp,88 in which the Court confronted extensive empirical
evidence that Georgia's capital sentencing system had been
compromised since 1973 by systematic racial bias-proof that death
sentences had been imposed at substantially higher rates against
those whose victims were white.89 Faced with this indictment of the
essential fairness of the Georgia system, "Justice Powell's majority
opinion famously conceded the salience of the statistics, startlingly
accepted their logical implications, but refused to accept their
arguably legal consequences."90 Weisberg reports that Powell
"apologize[s] for the entire criminal justice system, but ask[s] for
acceptance that society cannot afford to choose perfect justice over
law enforcement."" In effect, "it was precisely because Justice
Powell fully recognized that McCleskey had effectively condemned
the moral legitimacy of our entire criminal justice system that he
declared the Court unable to grant McCleskey the remedy he
sought."'"
An anticlimax to McCleskey came three years later, when Justice
Powell confessed in retirement that McCleskey was one of two
decisions he most regretted; "[i]n effect," Weisberg quips, "Justice
Powell uttered an apology for his previous apologia."93  Justice
Blackmun likewise eventually renounced capital punishment as
inherently arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious, and mistaken.94
State of Texas's post-1972 capital statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the State of Florida's post-1972 capital statute).
87. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 1430.
88. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
89. See id. at 279; BALDUS ET AL., supra note 84, at 311-40 (detailing the statistical
evidence presented by plaintiff in the McCleskey case); see also SAMUEL R. GROSS &
ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING 134-58 (1989).
90. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 1431.
91. Id. at 1432-33.
92. Id. at 1432.
93. Id. at 1433 (citing JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 450-53
(1994)).
94. Id. at 1433-34 (citing Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-59 (1994) (Blackmun,
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Beyond these judicial acts that, Weisberg shrewdly suggests,
parallel executive clemency in effect, he turns finally to a close
examination of two legislative clemencies, the first the New York
capital statute crafted after a long period of gubernatorial vetoes of
earlier capital statutes by New York governor Mario Cuomo.95
Weisberg designates the resulting exceedingly strict and limited
statute as "the first of what one might call our politically correct death
penalty laws,"96 having built so many procedural safeguards into New
York's capital sentencing that only a handful of defendants have
received death sentences under the statute and none has been
executed under the statute.97 Weisberg sees the statute as "a kind of
apology for the political decision to reinstate the formal death penalty
law, offering a kind of implicit pre-remission of death sentences .... "98
Weisberg points, finally, to the post-Ryan clemency actions of
the Illinois' legislature as another example of legislative apologia.
Weisberg details a remarkable series of substantive and procedural
reforms that work to narrow capital discretion in Illinois and assure
greater reliability in police investigation, interrogation of suspects,
line-up identification, use of informant and eyewitness testimony, and
other matters. 99 "[T]hese are essentially apologies for the whole
history of abuses by the Illinois police," Weisberg concludes.100 In
sum, Weisberg concludes that Governor Ryan's decision merely
echoes decisions made by the scholars who drafted the Model Penal
Code, the Supreme Court justices who compromised the majority in
Furman, Justices Powell and Blackmun in the years after McCleskey,
the New York State Legislature, and the very Illinois General
Assembly that heaped such scorn on Governor Ryan for deciding that
he "must act." 101
Jonathan Simon's essay focuses not on the rhetorical task that
faced Governor Ryan, but rather upon the anguished voices of the
victims' families who testified in clemency hearings during October
and November of 2002, months prior to the Governor's mass
J. dissenting) (offering lengthy personal justifications for concluding: "I no longer shall
tinker with the machinery of death").
95. Id. at 1434-35. For information about Governor Mario Cuomo's consistent
decisions to veto New York bills to reinstate capital punishment, see BEDAU, supra note
13, at 18.
96. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 1436.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1436-39.




clemency decision. Confirming Austin Sarat's observations about the
increasing political significance of the victims' rights movement for
modern criminal sentencing, Simon suggests that modern capital
punishment is "investing a new body of discourse, the speech of
capital victims, with extraordinary political significance." 0  Simon
recounts how "[w]eeks of dramatic testimony" from these victims
"turned public attention away from the harsh criticism" of the Illinois
criminal process and "toward the savagery of the crimes," thereby
leading Illinois newspapers "to turn against the clemency process."'0 3
Simon suggests that the capital sentencing paradigms that have
emerged since 1972 may be "unleashing a new (or rather very old)
model of how truth is produced in the service of governance, a 'game
of truth' quite foreign to the way power and knowledge have
operated within modern forms of law and administration. 1"" Simon's
specific reference is to parrhesia, a form of "fearless speech" known
to ancient Greece and reflected in the tragedies of Euripides, which
has been given recent prominence by Michel Foucault: "[R]ather
than describing speech in general, or even political speech, parrhesia
in ancient Greece described a more specific cultural practice of
speech in which the speaker frankly reveals his personally known
truth at great risk out of a duty of loyalty to another (or to the public
good).'1
0 5
The three key elements of parrhesia were: a complete and open-
hearted frankness by the speaker, the reliance upon a truth emerging
from the speaker's own deepest beliefs, and the risk of danger that
accompanied the speech." 6 Indeed, the truth embraced in an act of
parrhesia was validated by the risks the speaker took in speaking
candidly with the sovereign, who possessed obvious power to retaliate
if not persuaded. 107 Finally, as Simon notes, the speaker of parrhesia
was often seen as acting under a special kind of duty, "the self-
recognized obligation to speak when to do so is required by one's
relationship to the other."'0 8
While Simon acknowledges that "[m]odern democracies rely on
games of truth quite distinct from those of ancient Athens," he
nonetheless finds a strong parallel emerging as victims' voices grow
102. Simon, supra note 25, at 1379.
103. Id. at 1380.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1382.
106. Id. at 1388-91.
107. Id. at 1390-91.
108. Id. at 1392.
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more central to modern sentencing regimes.109 Normative legal
scholars have expressed uneasiness about these developments for at
least three reasons: the tendency of victim speech to emphasize
vengeance over proportionality in choosing criminal sanctions; the
indirect injury to victims themselves, who can become locked in their
emotionally passive "victim" roles; and the broader elevation of
subjective feelings over reason as a measure of legal and political
policy.1 °
After a thoughtful and nuanced examination of parrhesia in the
Athenian context, drawing especially upon Euripides' Ion, Electra,
and Orestes,"' Simon moves to present-day America, suggesting that
the victims' families who testified during the Illinois clemency
hearings were engaging in "fearless speech" characteristic of
parrhesia. Freed from the strict evidentiary constraints of the
courtroom, Simon observes, the clemency hearings permitted
openhearted and agonized frankness from victims' families."' The
deeply felt personal truth that emerged had remarkable power over
listeners, including experienced members of the press and other
observers." 3 Perhaps drawing a more strained analogy, Simon argues
that the victims' family members faced the "danger" that their
openness would revive their former pain and that their speech might
be ignored."4 Simon's essay closes with a prediction that such
anecdotal truth telling will likely remain a fixture in post-modern
America, and he shares his own concerns about the problematic
features of such speech. 15
Spurred by Austin Sarat's earlier article, however, my thoughts
moved in a different direction. As I apply the parrhesiatic paradigm
to the Illinois clemencies, it seems to fit Governor Ryan himself, not
the victims' families. His "I Must Act" speech bore, in my view, all of
the features of classical parrhesia. The two elements of the speech
that Sarat found unsuccessfully reconciled-Ryan's personal history
of strong identification with victims' families, and yet his unfolding
horror in finding how poorly the Illinois criminal justice system sorted
truth from error1 16-- both seem to have emerged from personal
109. Id. at 1382.
110. Id. at 1381.
111. Id. at 1388-400.
112. Id. at 1404.
113. Id. at 1402.
114. Id. at 1406-07.
115. Id. at 1409-10.
116. Sarat, supra note 20, at 1347.
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encounters that led to Ryan's "fearless speech." His act was
prompted by a sense of felt duty, despite the contempt and anger he
accurately foresaw from the Illinois legislature, the courts, and the
public at large.
Since elected officials, even those at the very end of their terms,
serve "the people," who are the ultimate sovereigns in our
representative democracy, Governor Ryan indeed risked censure
from those with the greatest power to condemn him, albeit only to
banishment from electoral politics. Indeed Ryan delivered his "I
Must Act" speech fully aware of these risks:
This is a blanket commutation. I realize it will draw ridicule,
scorn and anger from many who oppose this decision. They will
say I am usurping the decisions of judges and juries and state
legislators. But as I have said, the people of our state have
vested in me to act in the interest of justice. Even if the
exercise of my power becomes my burden I will bear it. Our
constitution compels it. I sought this office, and even in my
final days of holding it I cannot shrink from the obligations to
justice and fairness that it demands." 7
Until I read Jonathan Simon's fascinating essay, I did not know
how best to characterize Governor Ryan's rhetoric. I am now
persuaded that it was a pure act of parrhesia. As such, despite the
logical tensions that Austin Sarat found rhetorically unsatisfying,
Ryan's declaration expressed a personal truth beyond jurisprudential
logic, a speech "that reflects the complete knowledge of the speaker
on the topic," as Simon has put it." 8 In so doing, Governor Ryan
joined those other eminent jurists and legislative actors described in
Robert Weisberg's essay, all of whom spoke out after long personal
and professional encounters with the machinery of death: Professor
Herbert Wechsler and the drafters of the Model Penal Code; the
Supreme Court majority in Furman v. Georgia; Justices Lewis Powell
and Harry Blackmun in the post-McCleskey era; and the New York
and Illinois legislatures in the early 2000s.
They joined as witnesses to three interrelated truths. The first
two appear in canonical form in the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
Woodson v. North Carolina:"9 "[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long....
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
117. Ryan, supra note 6, at 11.
118. Simon, supra note 25, at 1389.
119. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case." '
If death is a special penalty, they appear to say, and if the state
must exercise special care before imposing it, then we who administer
this special penalty must assure ourselves that such care is invariably
taken in capital charging and sentencing decisions.
Yet as Professor Charles Black argued thirty years ago with
eloquence, passion, and prescience-and as Justice Blackmun and
Governor Ryan have since found to their dismay:
the possibility of mistake in the infliction of this penalty and the
presence of standardless arbitrariness in its infliction" are not
"fringe-problems, susceptible to being mopped up by minor
refinements in concept and technique, but... [exist] at the very
heart of the matter and ... [are] insoluble by any methods now
known or now foreseeable."12'
In light of this evidence Professor Black reframed retributivist theory:
If this thesis is right, then in the full context the retribution
question takes on what seems to me a new form. One must
now ask oneself whether the moral value of sheer retribution is
sufficient to justify not only the infliction of death in accordance
with clear standards and without error, but also the infliction of
death without clear standards and by mistake. 2
Professor Black's answer to that central question, like that
offered by Governor Ryan, is "no." As Black put it, "Though the
justice of God may indeed ordain that some should die, the justice of
man is altogether and always insufficient for saying who these may
be. ' 123 Or as Governor Ryan declared more simply, "The legislature
couldn't reform it. Lawmakers won't repeal it. But I will not stand
for it. I must act."'
24
May the readers of this wonderful Colloquium find themselves as
deeply engaged by these authors and their thoughts as I have been.
120. Id. at 305.
121. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 9-10 (1974).
122. Id. at 24.
123. Id. at 96.
124. Ryan, supra note 6, at 11.
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